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Immunity from Regulatory Price Squeeze Claims:
From Keogh, Parker, and Noerr to
Town of Concord and Beyond"
I. Introduction
On September 21, 1990, the First Circuit handed down its decision in
Town of Concord, Massachusetts v. Boston Edison Co.' This case, the
most recent in a growing line of court of appeals decisions examining the
antitrust implications of public utility rate structures,2 represents the first
time a United States court of appeals has unequivocally stated that an
antitrust action based upon a "price squeeze"' could not be maintained
against a utility whose wholesale and retail rates were both fully regula-
ted.4 Town of Concord notwithstanding, the courts are far from agreeing
whether investor-owned electric or natural gas utilities are immune from
federal antitrust liability arising from rates approved by the appropriate
state or federal regulators, nor have they been able to agree on the reason-
ing used to support a given answer. The Supreme Court has yet to grant
certiorari and decide the issue. 5
* I would like to thank Professor Lino Graglia and Messrs. Larry Hilton and Casey Wren for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Note. I would also like to thank Professor John Meyer and
Judge Stephen Breyer for sparking my interest in antitrust issues and feeding fuel to the fire,
respectively.
1. 915 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1337 (1991).
2. See City of Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1170 (1983); City of Groton v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 662 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1981);
City of Mishawaka, Ind. v. American Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1980) (Mishawaka II),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981); City of Mishawaka, Ind. v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 560 F.2d
1314 (7th Cir. 1977) (Mishawaka 1), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 922 (1978).
The D.C. Circuit recently addressed a "price squeeze" claim against Southern California Edison.
However, its review of orders entered by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) was
limited to evidentiary matters. See City of Anaheim, Cal. v. FERC, 941 F.2d 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
3. Generally, a "price squeeze" is alleged when a vertically-integrated firm with a monopoly at
the wholesale level and competition at the retail level manipulates its wholesale prices in order to
"squeeze" competing retailers (which are the monopolist's wholesale customers) out of the retail
market. See John E. Lopatka, The Electric Utility Price Squeeze as an Antitrust Cause ofAction, 31
UCLA L. REV. 563, 565 (1984); infira notes 46-59 and accompanying text.
4. See Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 18-19.
5. The petitioners in Town of Concord filed a petition for certiorari which the Supreme Court
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This Note explores both the price squeeze as an economic and legal
phenomenon and three legal doctrines supporting antitrust immunity for
fully regulated utility rates-the Keogh "filed rate" doctrine,6 the Parker
"state action" doctrine,7 and the Noerr-Pennington "political action"
doctrine'-in light of the First Circuit's decision in Town of Concord, as
well as other recent decisions examining the applicability of federal
antitrust law to regulated utility rates.
Part II provides an overview of those aspects of public utility eco-
nomics and regulation that are relevant to this inquiry. Part III discusses
the price squeeze, both in theory and in practice, in regulated and unreg-
ulated industries. Part IV outlines the origins and evolution of the filed
rate, state action, and political action doctrines as well as their applicability
to regulatory price squeeze claims brought against electric and natural gas
utilities. Finally, Part V offers some concluding remarks on the past,
present, and future of this niche of antitrust law.
II. Fundamentals of Utility Economics and Regulation
Providing electricity to consumers requires three basic processes:
generation, transmission, and distribution? Generation is the process of
converting oil, natural gas, and other forms of energy into electricity.
denied on March 18, 1991, leaving the issue unclarified. 111 S. Ct. 1337 (1991). The petitioners
sought a rehearing, which was also denied. 111 S. Ct. 2047 (1991).
6. The "filed rate" doctrine says, in essence, that any rate filed with and approved by the
appropriate regulatory agency has the imprimatur of the government and cannot be the subject of legal
action against the private entity that filed it. This doctrine is attributed to the Supreme Court's decision
in Keogh v. Chicago & Northwest Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922). See infra notes 75-88 and accompanying
text.
7. The "state action" doctrine has its roots in the Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution. It is based on the belief that federal antitrust law may not intrude upon state sovereignty
when the State is actively involved in the disputed conduct. While the doctrine is commonly attributed
to the Supreme Court's decision in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), it actually appears to have
been born in the earlier decision of Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904). See infra notes 100-10 and
accompanying text.
8. The "political action" doctrine protects the First Amendment rights to assemble and petition
government. In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conferencev. Noerr Motor Freight Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961), and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), the Supreme Court held that
any anticompetitive consequences of a legitimate effort to petition the government were immune from
federal antitrust prosecution. See infra notes 127-47 and accompanying text.
9. MICHAEL A. CREW & PAUL R. KLEINDORFER, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY
REGULATION 169 (1986); see also FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, POWER POOLING IN
THE UNITED STATES 25 (1981) [hereinafter FERC, POWER POOLING] (describing the process of energy
supply in the United States). With about 3500 corporate, cooperative, municipal, state, and federal
entities engaged in the generation, transmission, or distribution of electric power, the combination of
their efforts makes the electric power industry the largest industry in the United States. See PAUL L.
JOSKOW & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER: AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTRICAL UTILITY
DEREGULATION 11 (1983); CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 523,
538-39 (1984).
400
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Because electricity is typically produced on a much larger scale than is
demanded by individual customers, generation is usually performed at-
centralized facilities, often located a considerable distance from the
consumer.1" Transmission involves sending the electricity generated at a
power plant through high-voltage wires to a substation, where it is
transformed into low-voltage electricity ready for distribution through
low-voltage lines to individual customers." The ownership structure of
these three elements of the electricity supply process can vary from
complete vertical integration to separate ownership at each level; likewise,
ownership may rest in the hands of a private corporation, a cooperative,
or a government enterprise. 2
A. Investor-Owned Utilities and Other Suppliers
The private firms that supply most American homes and businesses
with electricity are called investor-owned utilities (IOUs). Most IOUs are
fully integrated, operating at all three levels of the industry. 3  Inves-
tor-owned utilities supply approximately three-fourths of the nation's
electricity. The remainder is supplied by (generally nonintegrated)
government- and consumer-owned systems.' Approximately 2000
10. CREW & KLEINDORFER, supra note 9, at 169-70. For a more detailed discussion of the
technical aspects and economic considerations of the electric generation process, see JOSKOW &
SCHMALENSEE, supra note 9, at 45-58.
11. See CREW & KLEINDORFER, supra note 9, at 170; JOSKOW & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 9,
at 59.
12. Thus, William Iulo has noted that:
[Electric power] is supplied by a complex agglomeration of individual electric supply
systems of widely differing economic and legal characteristics. These electric supply
systems vary in nature from a small rural cooperative distributing power to a hundred or
fewer customers to a large corporate utility serving the power needs of two or three
million customers in an extensive metropolitan area.... An individual electric supply
system may itself generate all the energy demanded by its customers, or it may obtain,
by purchase or interchange, all or a portion of its needs from other utilities, government
agencies, industrial enterprises, or it may utilize any combination of these sources....
The market served by an electric supply system may include only densely populated and
industrialized sections within a relatively limited geographic area; or it may be comprised
of sparsely populated rural territory spread over a wide geographic area; or the individual
system may serve a region with both rural and metropolitan sections.
WILLIAM IULo, ELECRIC UTILITIES-COSTSAND PERFORMANCE 1-2 (1961); see also PHILLIPS, supra
note 9, at 538-39 (describing "four distinct ownership segments" in the industry: (1) privately owned
systems; (2) state, municipal, and local systems, such as public utility districts and special authorities;
(3) cooperatively owned systems; and (4) federal agencies).
13. See James E. Meeks, Concentration in the Electric Power Industry: The Impact of Antitrust
Policy, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 64, 67-69 (1972). About 10% of domestic IOUs have no generating
capacity of their own; instead, they buy power from other public and private utilities to supply their
customers. JOSKOW & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 9, at 11.
14. See Paul L. Joskow, Regulatory Failure, Regulatory Reform, and Structural Change in the
Electrical Power Industry, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 125,
129 (Martin N. Baily & Clifford Winston eds., 1989) ("[B]etween 75 and 80 percent of the electricity
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municipalities and cooperatives have their own distribution companies, but
only a handful generate their own electricity-most purchase the electricity
they distribute from IOUs or from government-owned facilities, such as
those which are a part of the Tennessee Valley Authority."5
Many IOUs participate in power pools, which allow them to buy the
excess output of other producers in order to distribute it to their own
customers when their self-generated supply is insufficient. Similarly,
participation in the pools benefits the IOUs by giving them access to other
retail markets, providing them with a means of selling electricity to other
utilities outside of their own territories. 6 The basic idea is that two or
more utilities, through either a "formal"17 or "informal" 8 pooling agree-
ment, interconnect their transmission lines, allowing each member of the
pool to "buy" or "sell" excess power simply by throwing a switch which
connects their "grid" 9 with that of another member.2" As a result, an
integrated utility often distributes electricity generated by a different,
interconnected company.
B. Regulation of Investor-Owned Utilities
Investor-owned utilities are subject to pervasive economic regulation
by municipal, state, and federal authorities. Franchising power usually
rests with the state,2 ' or is shared between the state and local govern-
supplied is provided by about 100 independent, private investor-owned utilities (IOUs). The rest is
generated or distributed by 3,000 publicly or cooperatively owned entities that vary widely in size,
structure, and form of ownership." (footnotes omitted)).
15. See Town of Concord, Mass. v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1337 (1991). For general discussions of the structure of the utility industry, see
JOSKOW & SCHMALENsEE, supra note 9, at 11-12, 16-20, and Meeks, supra note 13, at 67-69.
16. See generally JOSKOW & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 9, at 66-77 (discussing the types of
"pooled" or coordinated agreements and analyzing the economies available to larger pooling systems
that are able to maintain a satisfactory level of cooperative activity).
17. See FERC, PoWk POOLING, supra note 9, at 9 n.2 (defining a "formal" power pool as "two
or more electric systems which coordinate the planning and/or operation of their bulk power facilities
for the purpose of achieving greater economy and reliability in accordance with a contractual agreement
that establishes each member's responsibilities").
18. See id. at 6 n.1 (defining an "informal" power pool as a group of utilities that "has agreed
informally to establish common principles and practices for interconnected operation, to jointly review
area power supply problems and establish criteria for power supply adequacy, ... and to seek
coordinated action for best economy and reliability, but which relies on voluntary adherence by
members to pool principles and criteria").
19. "Grid" is jargon for the interconnected power supply and distribution system to which a given
utility is attached.
20. See PHILLIPS, supra note 9, at 543-45; Meeks, supra note 13, at 101-04.
21. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1001 (West 1975 & Supp. 1991) ("No ... gas
corporation [or] electrical corporation ... shall begin the construction of... a line, plant, or system,
or of any extension thereof, without having first obtained from the [California Public Utilities
Commission] a certificate that the present or future public convenience and necessity require or will
402
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ments.22 Typically, IOUs operate as franchised monopolies serving retail
customers in legally defined service territories. 3 In a few areas, where
permitted by state law, utilities have overlapping franchises and may
theoretically compete with one another for retail customers.'
Sales of electricity are generally characterized as either "wholesale"
or "retail" transactions. Wholesale (or "bulk") sales involve one utility
selling its generated electricity to another utility, which the latter will
distribute to its customers. 5 Sales of electricity directly from a utility to
the end-user are retail transactions.' In most cases, both the price at
which one utility sells to another-the wholesale rate-and the price a
utility charges its retail customers-the retail rate-must be approved by the
appropriate regulators.
All fifty states have commissions that regulate the rates which IOUs
may charge their retail customers. The overriding principle of rate
regulation is that IOUs should be allowed to charge prices which cover the
prudently incurred costs of providing service, including a "fair" rate of
return on capital.' This return should be sufficient to compensate the
owners of the utility for the risk-adjusted cost of their investment and to
allow the utility to attract new investors in order to expand capacity and
require such construction."); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 68 (McKinney 1989) ("No gas corporation or
electric corporation shall begin construction of a gas plant or electric plant without first having obtained
the permissionand approval of the [New York Public Service Commission]. No such corporation shall
exercise any right or privilege under any franchise hereafter granted ... without first having obtained
the permission and approval of the commission."); TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1446c, § 50(1)
(Vernon 1989 & Supp. 1991) ("No public utility may in any way render service directly or indirectly
to the public under any franchise or permit without first having obtained from the [Public Utilities
Commission] a certificate that the present or future public convenience and necessity require or will
require such installation, operation, or extension.").
22. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111%, 8-406(a) (Smith-Hurd 1988) ("No public utility not
owning any city or village franchise... shall transact any business in this State until it shall have
obtained a certificate from the [Illinois Commerce] Commission that public convenience and necessity
require the transaction of such business.").
23. See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1446c, § 50(2) (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1991)
("[N]o retail public utility may furnish, make available, render, or extend retail public utility service
to any area to which retail utility service is being lawfully furnished by another retail public utility...
without first having obtained a certificate of public convenience and necessity that includes the
[contested] area.").
24. JosKow & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 9, at 13.
25. Joskow, supra note 14, at 130.
26. Id. at 128 & n.3.
27. JOSKOW & SCHMALENSES, supra note 9, at 13; see Joskow, supra note 14, at 133-34. These
commissions, unless provided for in a state's constitution, are created by statute. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 366.04 (West 1968 & Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111%, 2-101 (Smith-Hurd 1988);
N.Y. PUB. SE.v. LAW §§ 5(1)(b), 65 (McKinney 1989); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1446c, §
5 (Vernon 1999 & Supp. 1991).
28. See JOSKOW & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 9, at 13.
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service.29 By contrast, municipally-owned systems generally are not
subject to state regulation.30
The Federal-Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), under authority
provided by the Federal Power Act of 1935,3 regulates all wholesale
sales made in interstate commerce by IOUs within the United States? 2
The FERC also has responsibility for approving power pooling arran-
gements, including the prices and terms governing intrapool transactions
and the rules under which pools operate and admit members, and for
promoting power system reliability and efficiency.3
29. Id.; see PHILLIPS, supra note 9, at 151-52; TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1446c, § 39(a)
(Vernon Supp. 1991); see also infra note 62 (discussing "reasonable" rates in terms of costs and
profit).
The determination of what costs are prudently incurred, what rate of return is fair to existing and
future owners, and what mechanisms are required to ensure that efficiency is rewarded and inefficiency
discouraged is a complicated process which seems to produce few "correct" answers and an almost
unceasing call for reform. For a more detailed discussion of the theory and practice of public utility
rate regulation, see CREW & KLEINDORFER, supra note 9, at 111-18, 124-32 (arguing that the economic
costs of regulation probably outweigh the economic benefits). See generally PHILLIPS, supra note 9,
at 281-377 (describing different ways to establish a rate base and rate structure).
30. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 366.11 (West Supp. 1991) (declaring that, with specified
exceptions, state regulatory laws are inapplicable to municipally-owned utilities); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
1112 3-105(1) (Smith-Hurd 1988) (excluding municipally-owned utilities from the definition of
"public utility"); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1446c, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (denying the
Public Utilities Commission the power to regulate municipally-owned utilities regarding services
provided within municipal boundaries). But see N.Y. PUB. SERv. LAw § 65 (McKinney 1989)
(subjecting municipally-owned utilities to the same requirements as privately-owned utilities with
regards to safe and adequate service, just and reasonable charges, and discriminatory or preferential
rates or services).
31. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 791a-828c (West 1988 & Supp. 1991).
32. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (1988) (granting the Commission power to regulate "the sale of
electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce"); see also Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC,
376 F.2d 506, 507-08 (6th Cir.) (affirming the district court's holding that the Federal Power
Commission, the predecessor of the FERC, had jurisdiction to require utilities to file, and maintain on
file, rate schedules covering their interstate wholesale sales), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 842 (1967).
Wholesale sales made by IOUs which are strictly intrastate in nature are subject to regulation by
the appropriate state authorities. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (1988) (stating that "any other sale of
electric energy" other than "the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce" is beyond
the purview of the Commission). However, the division between intrastate sales and interstate sales
is less clear than it may appear. Ultimately, the classification depends upon whether the electricity is
sold via a pool or other mechanism which might intermingle power generated in two or more states,
rather than the physical locations of the seller and buyer. Public Serv. Co. of Ind. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 375 F.2d 100, 103 (7th Cir.) (holding that a power company doing all its business intrastate
was engaged in interstate commerce because its power intermingled with a pool doing interstate
business), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 931 (1967).
33. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-1 (1988) (enabling the Commission to (1) exempt a utility from a state
law barring pooling in cases where the Commission finds that pooling would be economically useful,
and (2) recommend pooling to utilities in cases where doing so would optimize "the efficiency of use
of facilities and resources" or "increasell reliability"); see also Cincinnati Gas & Elec., 376 F.2d at
508 (stating that where electricity generated interstate and intrastate are commingled and flowing
through a utility's system, the Commission need not prove the source of electrical current supplied from
a pool in order to regulate it-each sale is "drawn from the integrated system and hence interstate in
HeinOnline -- 70 Tex. L. Rev.  404 1991-1992
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III. The Price Squeeze as an Antitrust Violation
Although most investor-owned electric utilities are, in effect, legally
protected monopolies, they have frequently been accused of misusing their
power to protect or expand their positions, in violation of the prohibitions
of section 2 of the Sherman ActI against monopolization or attempted
monopolization.35 Since the Supreme Court's decision in Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States,36 it has been clear that an electric utility,
with a validly obtained monopoly franchise "upstream" in the supply
process, may be found guilty of violating section 2 by monopolizing, or at-
tempting to monopolize, "downstream." 37 One misuse of monopoly
power is the creation of a price squeeze, which is a differential between a
utility's wholesale and retail rates that impedes the ability of the utility's
wholesale customers to compete with it at the retail level."
A. Relevant Antitrust Principles
Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it illegal for any person to
"monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States. " " In United States v. Grinnell Corp.,' the
Supreme Court defined the elements of monopolization as: "(1) the
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful
acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or
historic accident." 4 "Monopoly power," in turn, means "the power to
control market prices or exclude competition" in a relevant market.42
Attempted monopolization occurs when a firm not currently possessing
monopoly power in a particular market undertakes conduct (1) totally
nature" (quoting Pennsylvania Water& Power Co. v. FPC, 193 F.2d 230, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1951), aft'd,
343 U.S. 414 (1952))); Public Serv. Co. of Ind., 375 F.2d at 103 (upholding FPC's finding that the
petitioner's participation in a power pool which included out-of-stateutilities caused interstate electricity
to commingle with the utility's own generated power and enter into all of its sales, thereby giving FPC
jurisdiction over the utility's wholesale rates).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
35. Lopatka, supra note 3, at 564.
36. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
37. See id. at 377 ("The record makes abundantly clear that Otter Tail used its monopoly power
in the towns in its service area to foreclose competition or gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy
a competitor, all in violation of the antitrust laws.").
38. See Lopatka, supra note 3, at 564-65.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
40. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
41. Id. at 570-71.
42. Id. at 571 (citing United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391
(1956)).
1991]
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unrelated to competition on the merits; (2) that clearly implies the presence
or prospect of some degree of durable market power; and (3) that has
potentially significant exclusionary effects.43 In Aspen Skiing Co. v.
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,' the Supreme Court gave some guidance
in discerning acceptable from unacceptable conduct vis-A-vis section 2: if
the dominant firm's behavior reduces competition and cannot be justified
on efficiency grounds, it is unlikely to pass section 2 muster.'
B. The Theory of the Price Squeeze
As generally conceptualized, a price squeeze requires a firm with
substantial monopoly power in an upstream market (e.g., electricity genera-
tion) to integrate into one or more downstream markets (e.g., electricity
retailing) that use the upstream product as an input. The firm with
monopoly power in the upstream market thus becomes both a supplier to
and a direct competitor with firms in the downstream markets into which
it has integrated.' The "squeeze" occurs when the monopoly input
supplier raises the price it charges its downstream competitors so that they
cannot profitably sell the downstream product in competition with the
integrated firm. The integrated firm, of course, implicitly charges itself
less for the input than it charges its competitors.47 Thus, by engaging in
the "squeeze," an integrated firm can force its downstream competitors out
of business and "extend" its monopoly power into the new market."
However, even if an integrated firm can drive independent competitors
out of business and extend its monopoly to the second industry level, that
alone does not make a price squeeze anticompetitive. The mere fact that
43. See 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 313 (1978). Areeda and Turner's definition refines
the "classic" formulation of attempted monopolization-intentplus conduct plus dangerous probability
of success-to which many courts still turn. See Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 615 F.2d 427, 430 (7th Cir. 1980) ("The elements of attempt to monopolize are: '(1) specific
intent to control prices or destroy competitionwith respect to a part of commerce, (2) predatory or anti-
competitive conduct directed to accomplishing the unlawful purpose, and (3) a dangerous probability
of success.'" (quoting Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381,390 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 936 (1979))).
44. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
45. See id. at 610-11 ("Ihe evidence supports an inference that Ski Co. was not motivated by
efficiency concerns and that it was willing to sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer goodwill in
exchange for a perceived long-run impact on its smaller rival.").
46. Paul L. Joskow, Mixing Regulatory andAntitrust Policies in the Electric Power Industry: The
Price Squeeze and Retail Market Competition, in ANTITRUST AND REGULATION: ESSAYS IN MEMORY
OF JOHN J. MCGOWAN 173, 186 (Franklin M. Fisher ed., 1985).
47. Id.
48. Although the downstream firms may themselves have a legally obtained monopoly over retail
sales in a geographic area into which the upstream monopolist cannot directly intrude, there are still
methods by which the upstream monopolist can effectively compete for potential clients. See infra text
accompanying notes 69-70.
[Vol. 70:399
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a firm eliminates its competitors is not necessarily anticompetitive, because
every legitimate business activity that succeeds in helping a firm will likely
disadvantage that firm's competitors.49 Rather, a practice is "anticom-
petitive" only if it harms competition-that is, if it detracts from the ability
of present or future market participants to compete with the defendant.'
In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,5' Judge Learned Hand
wrote that a price squeeze violates section 2 of the Sherman Act when (1)
the firm conducting the "squeeze" has monopoly power at one industry
level, (2) its price at that level is "higher than a 'fair price,'" and (3) its
price at the second level is so low that its competitors cannot match the
price and still make a "living profit."52 Judge Hand proposed a "transfer
price test" to determine whether the integrated firm had engaged in a price
squeeze. 3 Simply put, a price squeeze occurs when an integrated firm
could not sell its downstream output profitably at prevailing prices if it had
to "pay" the same price for the input that it charges to its downstream
competitors.5
49. See MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1113 (7th Cir.) ("After all,
competition consists of winning business from rivals."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
50. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1977) ("The
antitrust laws... were enacted for 'the protection of competition, not competitors.'... Plaintiffs must
prove antitrust injury, which ... should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of
anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation." (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (emphasis in original))); Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 320 ("Taken as a whole, the
legislative history illuminates congressional concern with the protection of competition, not competitors
..... (emphasis in original)); Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 486 (1st
Cir. 1988) ("'Anticompetitive' ... has a special meaning. It refers not to actions that merely injure
individual competitors, but rather to actions that harm the competitive process."), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 1007 (1989).
51. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (Alcoa).
52. See id. at 437-38; see also Town of Concord, Mass. v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 18
(lst Cir. 1990) (reiterating Judge Hand's requirements, but stating that the effect of a price squeeze in
a fully regulated industry is not likely to result in a violation of § 2), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1337
(1991).
53. See Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 437.
54. See id. (holding that Alcoa practiced a price squeeze by selling aluminum ingot at so high a
price that similar manufacturers forced to buy their raw material from Alcoa could not make a profit
if they sold the finished product at the same price as Alcoa); Joskow, supra note 46, at 186-87 ("A
price squeeze is said to take place when the monopoly input supplier charges a price for the input to
its downstream competitors that is so high they cannot profitably sell the downstream product in
competition with the integrated firm.'). Alternatively, Professor Lopatka defines a "price squeeze"
as occurring when
MC. MC,
where P,, is the price charged by the integrated firm to its wholesale customers (i.e., its retail
competitors), MC,, is the marginal cost of providing wholesale distribution, P, is the price charged by
the integrated firm to its retail customers, and MC, is the marginal cost of providing retail distribution.
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At least two arguments can be made in favor of discouraging this
extension of monopoly power. First, insofar as it is more difficult for a
firm to enter an industry at two levels than at one, the monopolist, by
expanding its monopoly power, has made entry by new firms more
difficult.55 Second, the existence of competitors at the second level,
regardless of their immediate impact on price, provides an added incentive
for the integrated firm to develop better, more efficient means of serving
its customers. Specifically, the monopolist's failure to become more
efficient may enable the competing firms, by their own efforts to enhance
efficiency or product quality, to capture a growing share of the integrated
firm's second-level customers. 56
There are at least two situations, however, in which the circumstances
which create a "squeeze" might simultaneously create economic benefit.
First, the primary-level monopolist might carry out its second-level
activities more efficiently than its independent competitors-that is, there
may be economies of scope, as well as economies of scale, at work.'
Second, prices that squeeze out a "second-level" firm will benefit
consumers whenever that firm is itself a monopolist.58 Moreover, "the
In this case, the integrated firm's wholesale profits exceed its retail profits at the margin. See Lopatka,
supra note 3, at 588.
55. See Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 23. In addition, if "the monopolist previously set prices
cautiously to avoid attracting a competitive challenge, the added security of a two-level monopoly could
even lead [the] monopolist to raise his prices." Id. at 24; see also 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note
43, at 204-08, 243-54 (discussing the economic effect of a monopolist's full or partial vertical inte-
gration through merger, acquisition, and long-term requirements and output contracts). See generally
William G. Shepherd, Potential Competition Versus Actual Competition, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 5, 6
(1990) (discussing potential competition in general and advocating that entry barriers be considered only
peripherally, since they divert attention from the decisive conditions of monopoly).
56. See Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 24; see also 3 AREEDA & TURNEIR, supra note 43, at 204
("[The monopolist] faces the threat that inefficiency and lack of progressiveness will increase his
vulnerability to new entry.").
57. See Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 24 (explaining that prices that squeeze the less efficient
competitors could lower prices by driving the competitor out of business and lowering costs, thereby
saving economic resources overall); 3 AREEOA & TURNER, supra note 43, at 201 (explaining that
whenever vertical integration produces new efficiencies, productive resources are saved and consumers
are directly benefitted); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUsr PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
243 (1978) (arguing that a price "squeeze" shifts business from less to more efficient operations).
Scale economies arise when the production process is such that costs per unit can only be
minimized at high levels of output. Scale economies occurring at a sufficiently high level of output so
that only one firm can supply the market and operate at minimum average total cost are the basis of
"natural" monopoly theory. See WILLIAM W. SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 15-
16, 20 (1982). Scope economies, on the other hand, arise when the production or distribution of two
or more products is so intertwined as to make joint production or distribution more cost-effective than
production or distribution by separate entities. In such a case, an integrated firm (supplying both
products) enjoys a competitive advantage over single-product firms. See id. at 23-24.
58. Judge Breyer provides the following illustration:
If, for example, ingot costs $40, the fabricating process costs $35, and the profit-
maximizing price for sheet is $100, an ingot monopolist will charge $65 for the ingot,
hoping that competition at the fabricating level will keep the total price at $100. If a
408
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extension of monopoly power from one to two levels [of the production
process] does not necessarily, nor in an obvious way, give a firm added
power to raise prices."59
C. The Price Squeeze in a Fully Regulated Industry
Any analysis of the desirability of an antitrust solution to the price
squeeze problem requires that we clearly distinguish between "predatory"
price squeezes, which are the product of the utility's intent and conduct,
and "innocent" price squeezes which are the consequence of, among other
things, administrative inconsistency.' The former may be a proper
subject of antitrust scrutiny, while the latter are not.6 '
Full price regulation dramatically reduces the risk that predatory price
squeezes may occur. Specifically, regulation significantly diminishes the
risk that retail prices will rise because new firms will hesitate to enter the
market and compete after a price squeeze has driven pre-existing competi-
tors from the market. First, in a fully regulated industry regulators control
prices directly, as well as the range within which an expansion-minded
utility could operate, significantly reducing the opportunities for conducting
a price squeeze.62 Second, factors related to regulation, such as the
different, independentmonopolist dominates the fabricating level, however, [he] will mark
up the price by more than $35, because he wants to earn monopoly profits as well. The
results will be a market price of more than $100, resulting in smaller monopoly profits
overall (for the final price is too high), but greater profits for the second monopolist than
if he sold the sheet for only $100 .... Under these circumstances, entry by the ingot
monopolist into the sheet-fabrication level-even by means of a price squeeze-will help
the consumer by limiting the final price of sheet to $100.
Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 24; see also Fishman v. Estate of wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 563 (7th Cir.
1986) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (arguing that "successive monopolies injure consumers").
59. Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 23 (emphasis in original); see also BORK, supra note 57, at 229
("M[Vertically related monopolies can take only one monopoly profit."); RIcHARD A. POSNER & FRANK
H. EASTERBROOK, ANTTrrusT 870 (2d ed. 1989) ("There is only one monopoly profit to be made in
a chain of production."). But see supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
60. See Lopatka, supra note 3, at 603, 614-17 (defining "predatory" and "innocent" price
squeezes and explaining the conduct involved with each type).
61. Id. at 603; see MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1137 (7th Cir.)
("Ordinarily, antitrust liability should not be imposed when a firm acts in compliance with its
regulatory obligations."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983). But see City of Anaheim, Cal. v. FERC,
941 F.2d 1234, 1239 (D.C. Cit. 1991) (stating that "the intent of the utility has no bearing on the price
squeeze inquiry").
62. See Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 25 (noting that in regulated industries, regulation reduces
the risk of a price squeeze because "regulators control prices directly" and because statutes require
prices to be at "'reasonable' levels"); see also MCI Communications, 708 F.2d at 1107 ("Ultimately,
[monopoly power] analysis must focus directly on the ability of the regulated company to control prices
or exclude competition-an assessment which, in turn, requires close scrutiny of the regulatory scheme
in question."); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 361 F. Supp. 774, 780 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (holding that
a company lacked monopoly power since it lacked control over the ratemaking mechanism), affid, 481
F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973).
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economic ability of the market to support an additional firm or the legal
requirement that potential entrants first secure permission from the
appropriate regulatory agency, are more likely to determine entry into a
regulated industry than is a new entrant's fear of a two-level monopolist's
market power.' Finally, in a regulated industry such as electricity,
where the competing retailers are generally franchised monopolies
themselves, there is little chance that a price squeeze will drive them out
of the market. They would likely respond to higher wholesale rates by
requesting higher retail rates."
Furthermore, other factors suggest that attempts to control price
squeezes through aggressive enforcement of antitrust statutes may be
counterproductive, if not harmful. Specifically, to the extent that
regulators succeed in setting retail rates that reflect costs, an integrated
utility's prices are likely to squeeze only those independent distributors who
operate less efficiently (i.e., at higher cost) than the utility.' Conse-
quently, a rule preventing prices that might create a squeeze may be more
likely to discourage efficient operations and deprive customers of prices
that reflect lower costs than to preserve competition and protect consum-
ers.6
Statutes typically require regulators to maintain utility rates at "just and reasonable" levels. See,
e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (1988); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 451 (West 1975 & Supp. 1991); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 11 12h, 9-101 (Smith-Hurd 1988); N.Y. PUB. SFRV. LAW § 66(5) (McKinney 1989);
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1446c, § 38 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
"A 'reasonable' rate is one that permits the firm to recover its costs and earn a reasonable
profit." FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944).
63. See Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 26; see also Meeks, supra note 13, at 95-96 (discussing
the effects of territorial restrictions, such as "convenience and need" certification and franchise
requirements, on potential entrants). See generally 2 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF
REGULATION: INSTITUTIONAL issuEs 113-72 (1988) (disputing the legitimacy of regulated, natural
monopolies when other competitors wish to enter).
64. See Joskow, supra note 46, at 178, 209-13 (analyzing the lack of retail competition for "large
industrial customers," noting the existence of "[m]onopoly supply at the retail level," and arguing that
the assumption "that retail competition can and does play an important role in allocating resources" is
"largely wrong" in this area); cf. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 369 (1973)
("Each town in Otter Tail's service area generally can accommodate only one distribution system,
making each town a natural monopoly market for the distribution and sale of electric power at retail.");
Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 26 ("Higher wholesale electricity prices (or lower retail prices
elsewhere) will not lead the entire towns of Wellesley and Concord to pull up stakes and move to
Dover .... Even if an integrated utility such as Edison managed to set prices that severely squeezed
a distributor, it could not take over the municipality's distribution area without the regulator's
permission.").
65. This argument should work equally well for wholesale rates except in the situation where the
integrated firm experiences both economies of scale and economies of scope. In such a situation, the
latter may enable an integrated firm to drive an efficient downstream competitor out of the market, if
that downstream competitor is not also experiencing scope economies. See supra note 57.
66. See Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 26; see also MCI Communications, 708 F.2d at 1114
("Such a rule would tend to freeze the prices of dominant firms at their monopoly levels and would
prevent many pro-competitive price cuts beneficial to consumers and other purchasers.").
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D. Analyzing Utility Price Squeeze Cases
Prior to the First Circuit's decision in Town of Concord, a number of
courts indicated that a price squeeze by a regulated utility may be a
violation of federal antitrust law.67 In those cases, the plaintiff typically
alleged that an integrated utility with monopoly power in the wholesale
market had extended its power into the retail market by perpetrating a price
squeeze, in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.6"
An excellent illustration of the issues at stake is provided by Judge
McCune's opinion in Borough of Ellwood City, Pennsylvania v. Pennsylva-
nia Power Co. (Ellwood 1): '
Not only does Penn Power sell power to plaintiffs at wholesale
rates, but it [also engages] in the retail distribution of power to
customers in the area surrounding plaintiffs' service area .... For
practical purposes, competition between Penn Power and plaintiffs
can be seen most strongly in the service of industrial and commercial
customers having the option to locate in either the service area of
Penn Power or that of plaintiffs. These customers do have a choice
of suppliers when making their initial decision to locate their opera-
tions. If the retail rates of plaintiffs and Penn Power differ, the
location choice of the potential customer can be affected by the
differential. Plaintiffs and Penn Power also compete, at least
theoretically and on a long term basis, for service areas. If plaintiffs
were to become unable to serve their customers profitably, Penn
Power would logically be in the best position to assume plaintiffs'
present service ...
67. See, e.g., City ofKirkwood v. Union Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1170 (1983); City of Groton v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 662 F.2d 921 (2d Cir.
1981); City of Mishawaka, Ind. v. American Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1980)
(Mishawaka II), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981); City of Mishawaka, Ind. v. Indiana & Mich. Elec.
Co., 560 F.2d 1314 (7th Cir. 1977) (Mishawaka 1), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 922 (1978); Borough of
Ellwood City, Pa. v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 570 F. Supp. 553 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (Ellwood 11);
Borough of Lansdale v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 517 F. Supp. 218 (E.D. Pa. 1981); City of Newark
v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 467 F. Supp. 763 (D. Del. 1979); Borough of Ellwood City, Pa. v.
Pennsylvania Power Co., 462 F. Supp. 1343 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (Ellwood 1).
In the first reported decision to come out of the federal courts since Town of Concord, the
defendant utility was found to have conducted a price squeeze, essentially by manipulating the timing
of its rate requests to FERC and the California PUC; yet the court found no antitrust liability, holding
that the utility had no affirmative duty to mitigate the effect of the squeeze that might have occurred
as a result of the timing and amount of the two rate applications. See City of Anaheim, Cal. v.
Southern Cal. Edison Co., 1990-2 Trade Cas. (CC-) 69246, at 64904 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 1990).
68. See, e.g., City of Kirkwood, 671 F.2d at 1175-76; Mishawaka II, 616 F.2d at 978; Borough
of Lansdale, 517 F. Supp. at 219; City of Groton v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 497 F. Supp.
1040, 1052 n.14 (D. Conn. 1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 662 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1981); City
of Newark, 467 F. Supp. at 765-66; Ellwood I, 462 F. Supp. at 1344-46.
69. 462 F. Supp. 1343 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
1991]
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Plaintiffs must deal with Penn Power for their supply of bulk
power at wholesale rates. ... It is the position of the plaintiffs that
Penn Power thus has the ability to dictate the profitability of
plaintiff's [sic] operations, theoretically to the point of destroying,
completely, plaintiffs' ability to operate profitably, subject only to
state and federal regulation and market constraints.
A price squeeze claim is usually accompanied by allegations that other
actions by the integrated utility were designed to eliminate retail com-
petition. 1 The exact role of the price squeeze claim in the midst of the
other allegations is a subject of some dispute. In Professor Lopatka's
opinion, the price squeeze allegations in these cases are "the heart of the
antitrust complaint."' In fact, he goes on to speculate that "if the price
squeeze is deemed an insufficient basis of liability, few utility monopoliza-
tion claims would be brought, the other conduct allegations being specious,
unprovable, or equally insufficient." 3
On the other hand, Judge Breyer stressed in Town of Concord that in
the three court of appeals cases he declined to follow-City of Kirkwood,
City of Groton, and Mishawaka lI-the price squeeze claims are often only
one of several claims of "exclusionary" conduct, and that "the one court
that affirmed a Sherman Act § 2 judgment against a utility stressed that it
might well not have done so had the price squeeze stood alone."' As
yet, it is not clear whether electric utilities, barring some immunity, will
continue to be subjected to antitrust liability for conducting price squeezes
allegedly in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.
IV. Possible Sources of Antitrust Immunity from Utility Price Squeeze
Claims
Given the lack of consensus among the circuits concerning the validity
of price squeeze claims against fully regulated utilities, and the lack of
70. Id. at 1346.
71. See, e.g., City of Kirkwood, 671 F.2d at 1176 (stating that the plaintiff accused the utility of
refusing to establish a transmission rate for the city); City of Newark, 467 F. Supp. at 766 (stating that
the plaintiff charged the utility with refusing to "wheel" power-i.e., transport power from another
supplier across the utility's lines); id. (stating that the plaintiff charged the utility with imposing
restrictions, as a condition of sale, that prohibited the plaintiff from serving new customers); City of
Mishawaka, Ind. v. American Elec. Power Co., 465 F. Supp. 1320, 1328 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (stating
that the plaintiff accused the utility of threatening to terminate wholesale sales), aff'd in part, vacated
in part and remanded, 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981); id. (stating
that the plaintiff accused the utility of threatening to restrict the amount of power available for sale);
Ellwood I, 462 V. Supp. at 1346 (stating that the plaintiff accused the utility of refusing to allow
plaintiff to participate in a power pool).
72. Lopatka, supra note 3, at 605.
73. Id. at 605-06.
74. Town of Concord, Mass. v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 28 (lst Cir. 1990) (emphasis
in original) (referring to Mishawaka H, 616 F.2d at 986).
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guidance from the Supreme Court, perhaps the safest bet for a regulated
utility is to find a nice, warm blanket of immunity, to protect it not only
from the slings and arrows of price squeeze allegations, but from all other
potential antitrust complaints arising from the rate-setting process as well.
The decisions of various courts suggest that there may be three sources of
potential immunity for fully regulated utilities: the "filed rate" doctrine, the
"state action" doctrine, and the "political action" doctrine.
A. The Filed Rate Doctrine and Regulatory Price Squeeze Claims
1. The Origins and Evolution of the Filed Rate Doctrine.-The filed
rate doctrine had its origins in the case of Keogh v. Chicago & North-
western Railway.75 In Keogh, a shipper complained that certain railroads
had unlawfully conspired to set rates higher than they would have been in
the presence of competition.76 The Supreme Court held that the shipper
could not prevail on a claim that rates on file with the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) were unlawful under federal antitrust laws.' The
Court explained: "The legal rights of shipper as against carrier in respect
to a rate are measured by the published tariff. Unless and until suspended
or set aside, this rate is made, for all purposes, the legal rate, as between
carrier and shipper.""8  The filed rate doctrine has subsequently been
extended across the entire spectrum of regulated industries7
The filed rate doctrine assumes that all rates that have been filed and
approved are "reasonable and nondiscriminatory."' Regulated entities
are prohibited from charging rates for their services other than those
75. 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
76. Id. at 160.
77. See id. at 161-62.
78. Id. at 163.
79. See, e.g., SquareD Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409 (1986) (motor
carriage); Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571 (1981) (Arkla) (natural gas production);
Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951) (electric utilities);
INF, Ltd. v. Spectro Alloys Corp., 881 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1989) (common carriage generally); Pinney
Dock& Transp. Co. v. Penn Cent. Corp., 83 8 F.2d 1445 (6th Cir.) (dockside loading, unloading, and
handling), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 880 (1988); MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081,
1145 (7th Cir.) (telecommunications), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
For an excellent discussion of the development of the filed rate doctrine in the context of
interstate carriage, see Paul S. Dempsey, Rate Regulation and Antitrust Immunity in Transportation:
7he Genesis and Evolution of this Endangered Species, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 335 (1983). For an
updated discussion incorporating recent court decisions, see Michael A. Rouse, Note, A Re-Evaluation
of the "Filed Rate" Doctrine in Light of Revised Regulatory Policy and Carriers'Practices: INF, Ltd.
v. Spectro Alloys Corp., 23 CREIGHTON L. REv. 669 (1990).
80. SquareD Co., 476 U.S. at 415 (quoting Keogh, 260 U.S. at 161); see Arkla, 453 U.S. at 577-
78 (observing that the doctrine is based on the preservation of the regulatory agency's primary
jurisdiction over the reasonableness of rates); see also Montana-Dakota Util., 341 U.S. at 251 (stating
that a customer "can claim no rate as a legal rate that is other than the filed rate, whether fixed or
merely =accepted by the [Federal Power] Commission").
1991]
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properly filed with the appropriate regulatory authority.81 Likewise, the
doctrine precludes the rate-setting body from altering filed and approved
rates retroactively.'
Prior to the Sixth Circuit's 1988 decision in Pinney Dock & Transpor-
tation Co. v. Penn Central Corp.,' most courts that addressed the
applicability of the filed rate doctrine to price squeeze allegations
distinguished Keogh and its progeny' on one or more of the following
grounds: (1) the price squeeze allegation is not a direct attack on filed
rates, but rather on the relationship between wholesale and retail rates;'
(2) the filed rates have been questioned or held unlawful by the relevant
agency, thus excepting those rates from the "filed and approved"
requirement of the doctrine;86 (3) the filed rate doctrine applies only to
actions brought by customers, not by competitors;' or, (4) the filed rates
were "rubber stamped" by the relevant regulatory body, without requiring
81. Arkla, 453 U.S. at 577.
82. See id. at 578 (noting that "[n]ot only do the courts lack authority to impose a different rate
than the one approved by the [Federal Power] Commission, but the Commission itself has no power
to alter a rate retroactively"); FPC v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 391 U.S. 9, 24 (1968) (holding that the
Federal Power Commission lacked authority to change a price limit that it had previously established
in a "final, permanent certificate").
83. 838 F.2d 1445 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 880 (1988).
84. See James P. Denvir, The Sixth Circuit's Decision in Pinney Dock: The End of Utility Price
Squeeze Damage Claims?, ANTITRUST, Summer 1988, at 28, 29 (explaining the significant cases
involving the filed rate doctrine decided before Pinney Dock). But see City of Newark v. Delmarva
Power & Light Co., 467 F. Supp. 763, 769-70 (D. Del. 1979).
I consider it unlikely that Congress intended a federal court to impose liability on a public
utility for charging a retail rate which a state has authorized it to charge ....
I reach the same conclusion with respect to ... Delmarva's wholesale rates .... The
Federal Power Act contemplates that the expert eye of the FPC will oversee the wholesale rates
of public utilities in order to protect the public interest.... In order to effectuate that objective,
Congress provided for filing and review of rates and decreed that it would be unlawful for
anyone to charge more or less than the filed rate.
Id.
85. See, e.g., City of Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173, 1179 (8th Cir. 1982)
("Kirkwood does not quarrel with the reasonableness determinations of the FERC and PSC as to any
individual wholesale or retail rate. Instead, Kirkwood complains of anti-competitive effects resulting
from the interaction of rates which, taken separately, may be reasonable."), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1170 (1983).
86. See, e.g., City of Groton v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 662 F.2d 921, 929 (2d Cir.
1981) ("Disapproved tariffs provide no immunity when.., the regulatory agency expressly refuses
to commit itself pending investigation.").
87. See, e.g., City of Kirkwood, 671 F.2d at 1179 ("[The doctrine was created to protect
customers, not competitors."); Essential Communications Sys., Inc. v. AT&T, 610 F.2d 1114, 1121
(3d Cir. 1979) ("Mhe filed tariff rule has little or nothing to do with AT&T's duties underthe antitrust
laws toward its competitors ... ; competitors are not the intended beneficiaries of that rule of public
utility regulation."). But see City of Groton, 662 F.2d at 929 ("[A]n anticompetitivepractice embodied
in a tariff may violate the antitrust laws if it ... impacts upon competitors as opposed to customers
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active participation by the agency in the decision-making process or active
oversight of the competitive consequences by the agency.88
2. Pinney Dock and the Extension of the Filed Rate Doct-
rine.-Unlike both Keogh and Square D, which involved lawsuits brought
by customers, Pinney Dock involved an antitrust challenge to filed rates by
competitors of the putative monopolists. The defendants in Pinney Dock
were railroads which provided freight transportation to and from certain
dock facilities on Lake Erie. Each of the defendants also owned, operated,
or was affiliated with one or more of the docks. The plaintiffs were the
owners of a competing dock facility (Pinney) and a company which
operated self-unloading and conventional vessels used to ship bulk
commodities over Lake Erie and the other Great Lakes (Litton).89
The thrust of the complaint was that the defendant railroads had
conspired to restrain trade in, eliminate competition in, and monopolize the
business of providing dock services for iron ore and other bulk com-
modities being loaded or unloaded at docks on the Great Lakes. The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants sought to accomplish these ends by
engaging in secret meetings, by refusing to grant nonrailroad-owned docks
a competitive rail rate, by refusing Litton access to docks which could
accommodate self-unloading vessels, by charging Pinney higher-than-
competitive rail rates and switching charges, and by forcing any railroad
wishing to service the docks to forego their right to determine their rates
and services independently.'
The defendants contended that the Keogh doctrine foreclosed the
plaintiffs' damage claims based on unreasonable freight and handling
charges, because the defendants' rates had been filed with and approved by
the ICC.91 The plaintiffs responded that the Keogh rule applies only to
damage actions brought by customers, not by competitors. 9 The Sixth
Circuit, while acknowledging the limited construction favored by the
Second' and Third' Circuits, found no compelling reason to limit the
88. See, e.g., Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 594 (1976) (holding that even when
a utility could neither maintain nor abandon an allegedly anticompetitive tariff without express
regulatory approval, a utility may still be liable for antitrust consequences if "the option to have, or
not to have, such a program [was] primarily [the utility's], not the Commission's"); MCI Com-
munications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1145 (7th Cir.) ("The existing terms were not instituted
or required by the FCC, and AT&T could presumably modify them upon due notice. The tariffs could
not thus provide an excuse for AT&T's knowingly anticompetitive conduct." (citation omitted)), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
89. Pinney Dock & Transp. Co. v. Penn Cent. Corp., 838 F.2d 1445, 1449 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 880 (1988).
90. See id. at 1452.
91. See id. at 1455.
92. Id. See generally supra note 87 and accompanying text.
93. See Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1347 (2d Cir. 1985)
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applicability of the Keogh doctrine to suits brought by customers.95 Thus,
Pinney Dock's holding, if widely followed, would deprive price squeeze
plaintiffs of an important means of avoiding the application of the Keogh
defense: the argument that the rule operates to foreclose damages only in
actions brought by customers, not in those brought by competitors.'
3. Beyond Pinney Dock. Town of Concord and the Future of the
Filed Rate Defense in Price Squeeze Actions.-In Town of Concord,
Massachusetts v. Boston Edison Co.,' the First Circuit appeared to base
its holding on a variant of the filed rate doctrine. Specifically, the court
held that effective price regulation at both the wholesale and retail levels
makes it unlikely that any rate request will create a serious risk of
significant anticompetitive harm.9" The court made no explicit reference
to either the filed rate doctrine or Pinney Dock, but its decision seems
strongly influenced by the fact that the defendant utility's rates were fully
regulated by the FERC at the wholesale level and the Massachusetts
Department of Public Utilities at the retail level." While not an explicit
endorsement of Pinney Dock, the First Circuit's decision in Town of
Concord is consistent with Pinney Dock's two main themes: (1) approved
rates are presumptively not anticompetitive; and (2) the filed rate defense
may be used against antitrust claims brought by competitors as readily as
against the antitrust claims of customers.
B. The State Action Doctrine and Regulatory Price Squeeze Claims
1. Origins and Evolution of the State Action Doctrine.-Parker v.
Brown ' was the first Supreme Court case to clearly enunciate the state
action immunity from federal antitrust law.' In Parker, the Court
(limiting the use of the Keogh rule to customers in preventing a private shipper from bringing an
antitrust action against defendant motor carriers), aff'd, 476 U.S. 409 (1986); City of Groton v.
Connecticut Light & Power Co., 662 F.2d 921, 929 (2d Cir. 1981) ("Under the Keogh or 'filed rate'
doctrine, ... a public utility subject to regulation is not subject to antitrust liability to its customers
for rates or services provided under tariffs approved by the appropriate regulatory agency.").
94. See Essential CommunicationsSys., Inc. v. AT&T, 610 F.2d 1114 (3d Cir. 1979) (explaining
that Keogh applies to customers, not competitors).
95. See Pinney Dock, 838 F.2d at 1456-57 (stating that previous claims brought by shippers, the
defendants' customers, should not be read to preclude applicability of the Keogh doctrine to
competitors).
96. See Denvir, supra note 84, at 31.
97. 915 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1337 (1991).
98. Id. at 19.
99. See id. at 20.
100. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
101. See Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332, 345 (1904) ("[I]f the State has the power to regulate...
those who are to perform pilotage services, it must follow that no monopoly or combination in a legal
sense can arise from the fact that the duly authorized agents of the state are alone allowed to perform
the duties devolving upon them by law."); cf Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908, 911 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895)
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found that California's agricultural marketing program was immune from
antitrust scrutiny and held that the Sherman Act is "a prohibition of
individual and not state action."" 2
At the heart of the Parker doctrine is the principle of state
sovereignty. In our federal system, the several states retain all power not
transferred to the federal government by the Constitution. °3 The Parker
Court observed:
In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the
states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally
subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a
state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be
attributed to Congress."0
The Parker notion of state action immunity gave rise to the general
assumption that "all local government entities, including state agencies and
local political subdivisions of a state, were exempt from federal antitrust
laws." 5 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions, however, have narrowed
its application.
In a 1980 decision, California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc.,"°6 the Court, through Justice Powell, articulated the two-
pronged test by which putative state action defenses should be judged.
First, the challenged restraint must be "clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed as state policy."" °  Second, "the policy must be 'actively
supervised' by the State itself."0 8 Five years later, Southern Motor
("The state is a sovereign having no derivative powers .... [A]s the monopoly now complained of
is that of the state, no relief can be had without making the state a party, and this destroys the
jurisdiction of this court."). Both cases are cited in the Parker opinion to support the proposition that
the state, as sovereign, may impose restraints which the Sherman Act would otherwise prohibit. See
Parker, 317 U.S. at 352.
102. Parker, 317 U.S. at 352.
103. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
104. Parker, 317 U.S. at 351.
105. Keith E. Moxon, Comment, Municipal and Private Petitioner Immunity from Antitrust
Liability: A Declaration of Independence to Preserve the Parker and Noerr-PenningtonDoctrines, 65
NEB. L. REv. 330, 335-36 (1986).
106. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
107. Id. at 105 (quoting New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978));
see also Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 55 (1982) ("[P]lainly the
requirement of 'clear articulation and affirmative expression' is not satisfied when the State's position
is one of mere neutrality respecting the municipal actions challenged as anticompetitive." (emphasis in
original)); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975) ("It is not enough that ...
anticompetitive activity is 'prompted' by state action; rather, anticompetitive activities must be
compelled by direction of the State acting as a sovereign.").
108. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105 (quoting City of Lafayette, La. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion)); see also City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 412
(Brennan, I., plurality opinion) ("Cities are not themselves sovereign; they do not receive all the federal
deference of the States that create them. Parker's limitation of the exemption to 'official action directed
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Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States,1" unequivocally brought
private parties under the ambit of the Parker defense and also subjected
them to the Midcal test.110
2. Applying the State Action Doctrine to Utility Rate
Filings.-Combining the lessons of Midcal and Southern Motor Carriers,
the state action doctrine will provide a utility with immunity from federal
antitrust scrutiny if (1) its challenged activities are conducted pursuant to
a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy,"' and (2)
the state actively supervises the conduct. 1
The first prong of this test will be satisfied for regulated private
parties if state policies "permit, but do not compel" the challenged
conduct,1  or if a comprehensive regulatory scheme is found. 4  The
first prong will also be satisfied, even in the absence of an express
statutory provision, if the state legislature has "made clear its intent that
intrastate rates will be determined by a regulatory agency, rather than by
the market" 15 and if the state legislature has left the details to the
discretion of the agency which authorized the challenged conduct. 6 As
long as the resulting anticompetitive activity is a "foreseeable" consequence
of the authority delegated by the state, the requirement that the conduct be
the result of a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy
will be met.117
The second prong of the state action immunity standard set out in
Midcal requires that the challenged conduct be "actively supervised" by the
state.118 A state typically satisfies this prong by giving an administrative
by a state' is consistent with the fact that the States' subdivisions generally have not been treated as
equivalents of the States themselves." (citations omitted)).
109. 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
110. In Southern Motor Carriers the Court reasoned that:
The Parker decision was premised on the assumption that Congress, in enacting the
Sherman Act, did not intend to compromise the States' ability to regulate their domestic
commerce. If Parker immunity were limited to the actions of public officials, this
assumed congressional purpose would be frustrated, for a State would be unable to
implement programs that restrain competition among private parties....
The circumstances in which Parker immunity is available to private parties ... are
defined most specifically by our decision in [Midcal].
Id. at 56-57 (footnote and citation omitted).
111. Id. at 57; see supra note 107.
112. Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 57 (citing Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105).
113. Id. at 60.
114. See, e.g., Rural Elec. Co. v. CheyenneLight, Fuel & Power Co., 762 F.2d 847, 849 (10th
Cir. 1985) (finding that a combination of state constitutional and statutory provisions was adequate to
establish "state action" and validate the conduct in question).
115. Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 63-64.
116. Id. at 64.
117. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 42-44 (1985).
118. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
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agency supervisory authority over potentially anticompetitive private
conduct.'1 9  Agency review qualifies as "active supervision" if the
agency exercises ultimate control over the challenged anticompetitive con-
duct.1" This ultimate control criterion necessarily entails the power to
overturn a private decision that conflicts with state policy.12  However,
state agencies that tacitly approve, or merely fail to object to, the decisions
or recommendations of private parties may also satisfy the ultimate control
criterion." The Supreme Court has not yet determined whether judicial
review of private conduct can constitute "active supervision" under
Midcal.'13
(1980) (quoting City of Lafayette, La. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978)
(Brennan, J., plurality opinion)); Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 57 (quoting City of Lafayette);
Town of Halie, 471 U.S. at 46 n.10 ("In cases in which the actor is a state agency, it is likely that
active state supervision would also not be required .... Where state or municipal regulation by a
private party is involved, however, active state supervisionmust be shown, even where a clearly articu-
lated state policy exists.").
119. See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 102 (1988) ("Oregon's Health Divisionhas general
supervisory powers ... including the licensing of hospitals, and the enforcement of health laws ....
[I]t may initiate judicial proceedings... [and it) may deny, suspend, or revoke a hospital's license for
failure to [establish peer-review procedures]." (citations omitted)); Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S.
at 62 (noting that the Government conceded to the appellate court's finding that the Public Service
Commissions of North Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, and Tennessee "actively supervise the collective
ratemaking activities of the [private] rate bureaus").
120. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101; see 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 345 n.7 (1987)
(holding that certain forms of agency scrutiny of a privately established restraint were not active
supervision because they did not "exert[- any significant control over" the terms of the restraint);
Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 51 (finding that the relevant state commissions "have and
exercise ultimate authority and control over" intrastate motor carrier rates).
121. See Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101 ("The active supervision prong of the Midcal test requires that
state officials have and exercise power to review particular anticompetitive acts of private parties and
disapprove those that fail to accord with state policy.").
122. See Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 50-51, 64-65 (finding immunity even when a
proposed rate became effective if a state agency took no action within a specified period of time). But
cf. MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1145 (7th Cir.) (holding that a defendant
is not insulated from antitrust scrutiny when tariffs issued by the defendant take effect unless vetoed
by the relevant agency because the terms of the tariffs are not "instituted or required" by the FCC),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
123. Thus Justice Marshall wrote:
This Court has not previously considered whether state courts, acting in their judicial
capacity, can adequately supervise private conduct for purposes of the state-action
doctrine. All of our prior cases concerning state supervision over private parties have
involved administrative agencies or State Supreme Courts with agency-like responsibilities
.... This case, however, does not require us to decide the broad question whether
judicial review of private conduct ever can constitute active supervision, because judicial
review of privilege-termination decisions in Oregon, if such review exists at all, falls far
short of satisfying the active supervision requirement.
Patrick, 486 U.S. at 103-04 (citations omitted). See generally Michael Dlouhy, Note, JudicialReview
as Midcal Active Supervision: Immunizing Private Parties from Antitrust Liability, 57 FORDHAM L.
REV. 403, 416-23 (1988) (echoing the statement that the Supreme Court has not determined the
question of whether judicial review constitutes "active supervision" and arguing that the Court should
answer in the affirmative).
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Differential retail rates that have been considered explicitly, subjected
to public comment, and subsequently approved by a state regulatory
commission would be immune under the Midcal standard." The more
interesting question is whether the state regulatory commission must
consider the relationship between federally approved wholesale rates and
the proposed retail rates prior to approving the retail rates in order to
immunize the utility from antitrust liability for a resultant price squeeze.
An antitrust suit is unlikely to be limited to the naked allegation that
a rate relationship is unlawful. Ordinarily, a plaintiff will assert that the
rate differential was part of a pattern of exclusionary conduct, only some
of which is subject to state regulation." s And in such a case, the extent
of protection provided by the state action doctrine will be a focal point of
the court's analysis." s
C. The Political Action Doctrine and Regulatory Price Squeeze Claims
While the state action doctrine protects private and municipal actions
authorized by the state, "the Noerr-Pennington 'political action' doctrine
protects private efforts to influence government officials in creating or
implementing legislation that has anticompetitive effects.""n As such,
124. But see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974):
The nature of governmental regulation of private utilities is such that a utility may
frequently be required by the state regulatory scheme to obtain approval for practices a
business regulated in less detail would be free to institute without any approval from a
regulatory body. Approval by a state utility commission of such a request from a
regulated utility, where the commission has not put its own weight on the side of the
proposed practice by ordering it, does not transmute a practice initiated by the utility and
approved by the commission into "state action."
Id. at 357; see also Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1975) (stating that when the
option to have or not have a program rests primarily with the utility, rather than the regulatory body,
"Itihere is nothing unjust in a conclusion that [the utility's] participation in the decision is sufficiently
significant to require that its conduct implementing the decision, like comparable conduct by
unregulated businesses, conform to applicable federal law").
Despite the apparently contradictory posture of Southern Motor Carriers, the Court neither
overruled nor distinguished Jackson or Cantor in that opinion.
125. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., City of Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173, 1180 (8th Cir. 1982)
(holding that legislative policy neither authorizes nor encourages an alleged price squeeze and that,
while wholesale and retail rates are "actively supeivised" by the respective regulatory authorities, the
interrelation between those rates is not), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983). But cf. Town of
Concord, Mass. v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that a utility whose rates
are fully regulated at both the wholesale and retail level may ask regulators to approve rates that could
create a price squeeze, § 2 of the Sherman Act notwithstanding), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1337 (1991).
See generally Lopatka, supra note 3, at 622-23 (arguing that because some of the conduct of a utility
which is involved in a price squeeze is required by law and some is discretionary, only a portion of
the utility's conduct should be protected by the state action doctrine).
127. Moxon, supra note 105, at 351. See generally Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Liability for
Attempts to Influence Government Action: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45
U. CHI. L. REV. 80, 82-88 (1977) (discussing the Noerr decision, the limits of the antitrust exemption
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it springs less from the traditional power of the sovereign than from the
rights of individuals to petition the sovereign.
1. Origins and Evolution of the Political Action Doctrine.-Eastern
Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. 128 involved
an antitrust claim by truckers against an association of railroads. The
plaintiffs alleged that the railroads had undertaken a vigorous publicity
campaign aimed at procuring legislation (and subsequent enforcement
thereof) harmful to truckers. 29 The Noerr Court held that attempts to
secure the passage and enforcement of anticompetitive laws cannot form the
basis for antitrust liability,"13 regardless of any injury resulting to
plaintiffs."' The Court gave two reasons for its decision. First, to the
extent that state government has the power to restrain trade, a contrary
holding would be in direct conflict with the Parker doctrine.13 Second,
allowing such conduct to establish Sherman Act liability might substantially
impair the First Amendment rights of the people to assemble and to petition
the government.1 33
In United Mine Workers v. Pennington," decided four years later,
the Court expanded the Noerr doctrine to include efforts to petition the
executive branch 13' and broadened the scope of behavior which may be
protected. The Noerr doctrine, said the Court, "shields from the Sherman
Act a concerted effort to influence public officials regardless of intent or
purpose."136 Furthermore, the Court held that "[j]oint efforts to
influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though
intended to eliminate competition. Such conduct is not illegal, either
for private efforts to influence governmental action, and the application of Noerr to attempts to
influence the courts and administrative adjudicative bodies); James D. Hurwitz, Abuse of Governmental
Processes, the First Amendment, and the Boundaries of Noerr, 74 GEO. L.J. 65 (1985) (exploring the
limits and application of the Noerr doctrine and proposing a more systematic approach for addressing
conflicts between the policies favoring competition and those springing from the First Amendment).
128. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
129. Id. at 129.
130. Id. at 135.
131. See id. at 143-44 ("It is inevitable, whenever an attempt is made to influence legislation by
a campaign of publicity, that an incidental effect of that campaign may be the infliction of some direct
injury upon the interests of the party against whom the campaign is directed .... To hold that the
knowing infliction of such injury renders the campaign itself illegal would thus be tantamount to
outlawing all such campaigns.').
132. See id. at 137 & n.17 (noting that a contrary holding would allow use of the Sherman Act
to regulate political activity and citing Parker's holding that the validity of a state regulatory program
under the Act does not depend on the kind of political support necessary for its implementation); see
supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
133. See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137-38.
134. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
135. See id. at 669 (holding that the union's approaching the Secretary of Labor [an executive
officer] falls under the Noerr doctrine's protection of attempts to influence "public officials").
136. Id. at 670 (emphasis added).
1991]
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standing alone or as part of a broader scheme itself violative of the
Sherman Act."137
In California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,138 the
Court further extended the reach of the Noerr doctrine to attempts to
petition administrative agencies and the judiciary.139 California Motor
Transport rounded out the list of government entities one could petition
without fear of antitrust liability. But it also introduced the first limitation
on the exercise of the political action defense: actions designed to deny
plaintiffs access to the courts and administrative agencies are not protected
by the Noerr doctrine.' 4 The Court also emphasized that the nature of
the governmental body being petitioned is relevant to the availability of
Noerr protection. Conduct permitted in the political or legislative context
may not be immunized when used in the adjudicatory process."'
In Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.,' the Court
began to "fine tune" the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. While California
Motor Transport established something of an outer boundary beyond which
Noerr immunity could not extend, there remained a vast field of actions
that do not exclude competitors from the adjudicatory process, yet may not
be "legitimate" attempts to petition government.
Under Allied Tube, antitrust immunity for acts of petitioning the
government may be either absolute or qualified. Absolute immunity
extends to acts of petitioning that result in restraints of trade imposed by
governmental action."4 Qualified immunity extends to acts of petitioning
that result in restraints of trade imposed by private parties if those
137. Id. (emphasis added).
138. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
139. See id. at 510-11 ("[I]t would be destructive of rights of association and of petition to hold
that groups with common interests may not, without violating the antitrust laws, use the channels and
procedures of state and federal agencies and courts to advocate their causes and points of view
respecting resolution of their business and economic interests vis-a-vis their competitors.").
140. See id. at 511-12 ("Mhe allegations are not that the conspirators sought 'to influence public
officials,' but that they sought to bar their competitors from meaningful access to adjudicatory tribunals
and so to usurp that decisionmaking process." (citation omitted)).
141. see id. at 513 ("Misrepresentations, condoned in the political arena [under the umbrella of
political expression], are not immunized when used in the adjudicatory process.").
142. 486 U.S. 492 (1988).
143. Regardless of the forum, private action that is a "sham" (not genuinely aimed at procuring
favorable government action) is not protected. Id. at 500 n.4; see California Motor Transp., 404 U.S.
at 511 (explaining the "sham" theory as the use of "power, strategy and resources" by one party to
harass and deter another party in the use of administrative and judicial proceedings "so as to deny them
'free and unlimited access' to those tribunals"); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961) ("There may be situations in which a publicity campaign,
ostensibly directed toward governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more
than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor and the application
of the Sherman Act would be justified.").
144. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 499 (citing Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136, and United Mine Workers v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 671 (1965)).
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restraints are "incidental" to "valid and genuine" efforts to influence
governmental action.'45 Qualified immunity "varies with the context and
nature of the activity.""4
The difficult task under Allied Tube is drawing the line that divides
restraints resulting from government action and those resulting from private
action in order to determine the level of immunity, if any, available to the
defendant. 147 But at least Allied Tube presents some sort of framework
for addressing the remaining issues.
2. Applying the Political Action Doctrine to Utility Rate
Filings.-Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, if a single agency has
jurisdiction over all of a utility's rates, a request by a utility for a price
squeeze, even for the specific purpose of injuring municipal competitors,
should be protected.' The existing system of dual regulation, however,
produces a critically different environment. In the wake of Federal Power
Commission v. Conway Corp. ,149 FERC has an obligation to consider the
anticompetitive effects of its rate orders, 150 but it is unclear whether
either FERC or the relevant state commission will have the authority,
ability, or interest to manipulate rates in order to prevent unwanted price
squeezes.' To be protected by Noerr-Pennington immunity, therefore,
requests for governmental action that will produce anticompetitive results
must be directed to governmental entities with the responsibility for and
interest in considering the competitive effects of their actions and the power
to decide whether to produce those effects. 52
145. Id. at 499 (citing Noerr, 365 U.S. at 143). Thus, for instance, where an ostensibly private
organization, such as the Federal Reserve, is empowered by statute to establish guidelines and
regulations, attempts by third parties to encourage or discourage certain actions should receive qualified
immunity.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 501-02. See generally William L. Monts, III, Note, Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v.
Indian Head, Inc.: An Emerging Conceptual Framework for Claims of Noerr Immunity, 41 S.C. L.
Rv. 633 (1990) (discussing the framework for analyzing Noerr immunity after Allied Tube).
148. Thus,
The agency would have official responsibility to consider the effects of its order, an
interest in evaluating the concerns of aggrieved competitors, and the power to decide to
produce those effects or not. The utility should be allowed to present its views to the
government and request action that will produce an anticompetitive end regardless of its
motive. This is the structure of requests for governmental action which the Court
intended to protect in Noerr and Pennington.
Lopatka, supra note 3, at 634.
149. 426 U.S. 271 (1976).
150. See id. at 278-79. FERC subsequently adopted procedures to comply with the Conway
mandate. See 18 C.F.R. § 2.17 (1983) (outlining the elements of a prima facie case of anticompetitive
price discrimination and adopting procedures for "raising price squeeze issues").
151. See Lopatka, supra note 3, at 634 & n.346.
152. See id. at 634-35.
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The Courts of Appeals that have ruled on the applicability of the
Noerr-Pennington defense to rate filings have reached widely disparate
results. In Litton Systems, Inc. v. AT&T,153 the Second Circuit held that
a regulated utility filing a tariff as required by law was "engaged in a
private commercial activity, no element of which involved seeking to
procure the passage or enforcement of laws."1" In MCI Communications
Corp. v. AT&T,155 the Seventh Circuit wrote that "[u]nder the so-called
Noerr-Pennington doctrine, activities such as state tariff filings are immune
from antitrust liability where their purpose is to influence government ac-
tion."15 6 In United States v. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference,
Inc.,57 the Fifth Circuit held that "joint efforts .. .to secure legislation
or commission regulation permitting collective ratemaking procedures
would clearly fall within the ambit of Noerr protection, inasmuch as it
would seek to influence policy. "158
City of Kirkwood v. Union Electric Co.,159 the only Court of
Appeals case explicitly addressing the applicability of Noerr-Pennington to
a utility price squeeze, held: "The Noerr-Pennington doctrine will not
protect a utility which manipulates the federal and state regulatory process
to achieve anti-competitive results. " 16° Unfortunately, Town of Concord
does not address the issue of political action immunity.
153. 700 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984).
154. Id. at 807. The court further stated:
AT&T cannot cloak its actions in Noerr-Pennington immunity simply because it is
required, as a regulated monopoly, to disclosepublicly its rates and operating procedures.
The fact that the FCC might ultimately set aside a tariff filing does not transform AT&T's
indepdndent decisions as to how it will conduct its business into a "request" for
governmental action or an "expression" of political opinion.
Id. (footnote omitted).
155. 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
156. Id. at 1153. But cf. id. at 1159-60 ("The Noerr-Pennington doctrine... immunizes only
those actions directed toward government agencies or officials. The fact that a common carrier's
decision may eventually provoke agency action or review does not alone call the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine into play."). Thus, mere regulatory "rubber stamping" of unilateral action taken by the utility
will not be protected under this view.
157. 672 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1982), af'd, 702 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1983) (en bane), rev'd on other
grounds, 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
158. Id. at 477.
159. 671 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983).
160. Id. at 1181. The court continued:
the facts in the instant case cannot be distinguished from those in Cantor, in which the
Supreme Court held that "nothing in the Noerr opinion implies that the mere fact that a
state regulatory agency may approve a proposal included in a tariff, and thereby require
'that the proposal be implemented until a revised tariff is filed and approved, is a sufficient
reason for conferring antitrust immunity on the proposed conduct."
Id. (quoting Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 601-02 (1976)).
424
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V. Concluding Remarks
The First Circuit's recent decision in Town of Concord is an exciting
new addition to the case law on utility price squeezes and provides
significant reinforcement for the Pinney Dock argument that rates which
have been filed and approved by the appropriate regulatory entity are
presumptively not anticompetitive. In addition, Judge Breyer's thorough
examination of the price squeeze phenomenon in both unregulated and
regulated industries may prove instructive as other circuits receive new
cases in this line.
Based upon the foregoing analysis, it would appear that the Supreme
Court, in its line of "state action" cases from Parker through Midcal and
Southern Motor Carriers has established fairly clear standards that must be
met in order to claim immunity from antitrust prosecution on that basis.
In the absence of "active supervision" or a "clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed" state policy, the utility's next best option may be
to argue a Keogh filed rate defense, saving the ever uncertain Noerr-
Pennington argument as a last resort.
Keith A. Rowley
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